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NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE NUCLEAR BLACK
MARKET: PROPOSING AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING NUCLEAR
EXPERTISE PROLIFERATION & NUCLEAR
SMUGGLING BY NON-STATE ACTORS
THOMAS BURCH
"Today, every inhabitant of this planet must
contemplate the day when this planet may
no longer be habitable. Every man, woman
and child lives under a nuclear sword of
Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of
threads, capable of being cut at any moment
by accident or miscalculation or madness."1
~ JFK
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a distinct possibility that “madness” will lead to the next
nuclear conflict. Terrorist groups, and even terrorist individuals, have the
money, means, and motive to build or purchase their own nuclear device2
and some have already tried.3

Unfortunately, the terrorist attempt to

acquire and use nuclear weapons is a natural progression of events.
However, the rapidity of the progression is disturbing. Terrorists are
utilizing computerized files, e-mail, and encryption software in order to

1

President John F. Kennedy, Address at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25,
1961). While it is more likely that President Kennedy was referring to the instability of
certain despotic leaders when he spoke of “madness,” the same general principle still
applies to individual terrorist or terrorist groups.
2
See Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The Terrorist Nuclear Threat: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Senator
Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Forign Relations).
3
See Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 106th
Cong. 9 (1999) (testimony of George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency)
[hereinafter Worldwide Threats I].
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hasten the accomplishment of their objectives.4 It may not be a question of
if they acquire nuclear weapons, but only a question of when.
While there are a number of disincentives that prevent states from
participating in the nuclear black market, most of these deterrents do not
apply to non-state actors. What actions should the international
community take in order to enforce these same restrictions against nonstate actors and thereby reduce the possibility of nuclear conflict? This
comment proposes two options. First, member parties could amend one or
all of several existing treaties on the subject. Second, the international
community can draft a new treaty or convention on nuclear smuggling and
proliferation that focuses on preventing non-state actors from participating
in the nuclear black market. This paper addresses both options and
concludes that the latter alternative would be the most effective means of
combating nuclear terrorism. Part II explains the background of the
terrorist threat by discussing why non-state actors may have access to, and
be willing to use, nuclear weapons. Part III discusses why the expansion of
existing treaties and the extension of universal jurisdiction to cover these
crimes are not satisfactory preventative measures. Part IV calls for a new
international convention that focuses on efforts to forestall nuclear
terrorism.
II. ESCALATING THREATS:
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION & THE EVOLVING TERRORIST OBJECTIVE
The U.S. Secretary of Defense recently stated that weapons of
mass destruction “will increasingly find their way into the hands of
individuals and groups of fanatical terrorists or self-proclaimed
4

Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 106th Cong.
617 (2000) (testimony of George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency)
[hereinafter Worldwide Threats II].
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apocalyptic prophets.”5 Several terrorist groups have shown an interest in,
or actively sought, nuclear materials in recent years, believing it to be part
of their “religious duty.”6 In recognition of this risk, President Bush is
seeking a thirty percent spending increase for programs that aim to keep
nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.7 Most of the money will go to
help Russia secure its nuclear facilities, which are probably the most
prolific sources of black market nuclear material.8
Nevertheless, while spending money on physical protection of the
materials is important, the scope of the problem is greater than a need for
physical security alone. The international community should adopt explicit
legal guidelines for the prevention and punishment of nuclear smuggling
and nuclear expertise proliferation. The connection between these
activities and international terrorism is well-accepted and extensively
documented.9 Developing an international convention that unequivocally
proscribes these activities and establishes legitimate preventative measures
may do more than delay the inevitable; it may help to avoid the problem
altogether.
There are three broad explanations for the increased risk that
terrorists will acquire and use nuclear weapons in the near future: (1) the
proliferation of nuclear information, (2) the availability of nuclear
weapons & improvised nuclear devices, and (3) the evolving terrorist

5

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND
RESPONSE at i (2001).
6
See Worldwide Threats I, at 9.
7
Bush Wants to Spend More to Safeguard Nuclear Materials; Most of the Money Would
Help Russia, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2003, at A6.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. SCORG AOR, 4385th Mtg. U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373Meeting (2001) available at http://www.unaukundcp.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/sc1373res_1373_english.pdf.
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objective.10 The following sections discuss these problems and lay the
foundation for developing the proposed legal framework.
A. Proliferation of Nuclear Expertise
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, numerous books, journals,
and websites have published blueprints for creating nuclear devices.
However, these resources are of minimal value for anyone actually
wanting to build such a weapon because this undertaking requires highly
specialized knowledge. Persons equipped with the proper technical
knowledge hold a Damoclean sword because selling or sharing this
information could result in the wrong person or groups possessing nuclear
capabilities.
The two most notable sources of information proliferation are the
“brain drain” and insider theft.11 These two categories are not completely
distinguishable as they both produce the same result. In both scenarios,
terrorists receive information necessary for building a nuclear weapon.
However, insider theft encompasses a slightly broader set of crimes and
includes a somewhat larger group of individuals. The concept of “brain
drain” only applies to a limited group of highly skilled employees.
Nevertheless, the brain drain dilemma poses a greater risk exactly because
of these special skills.

10

See Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures: Hearings Before the Military Research
and Dev. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Nat'l Sec., 105th Cong. 54-59 (1997)
(statement of Jessica Eve Stern, Former Director of Russian and Ukrainian Affairs, Nat'l
Sec. Council) [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures].
11
See Adam Treiger, Comment, Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing
Nuclear-Expertise Proliferation, 82 Geo. L.J. 237, 238 (1993); BRUCE
HOFFMAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INSIDER CRIME: THE
THREAT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS 7-30 (1990).
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1. Brain Drain
“Brain drain” refers to the problem of experienced and
knowledgeable scientists moving to countries that have no nuclear
program and sharing their knowledge and experience with those countries.
It may be the most dangerous form of information proliferation and the
problem is particularly troublesome in Russia and the former Soviet
Union.12

Thousands of Soviet scientists and engineers worked on

developing one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world before
suffering severe pay cuts or job loss after the collapse of the Soviet
empire.13 Although most probably recognize the dangers of disseminating
their knowledge to third world countries or terrorist groups, it only takes a
few scientists to actually build a nuclear device.14 Because the economic
incentives to sell nuclear information may be too strong, the international
community has a strong security interest in eliminating the threat.
It is only fair to mention that the problem does not rest solely in the
former Soviet Union. Pakistan recently arrested two nuclear scientists who
allegedly met with Osama Bin Laden to discuss nuclear capabilities for the
al-Queda terrorist network. Pakistan detained the scientists after receiving
a report of their meeting from U.S. law enforcement officials, but released
the two men after a brief period of interrogation.15 “Although Pakistani
authorities concluded the scientists violated a secrecy oath during trips
into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan … [a] trial, officials said, would
generate further international embarrassment and risk disclosure of

12

See Treiger, supra note 11, at 238.
See id. at 237-41.
14
See id. at 241.
15
Peter Baker & Kamran Khan, Pakistan to Forgo Charges Against 2 Nuclear Scientists;
Ties to Bin Laden Suspected, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at A1.
13
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Pakistan's nuclear secrets.”16 Pakistan placed its national interests ahead
of international security.
Even if Pakistan made a sound decision in this particular case, the
international community cannot continue to place its security in the hands
of individual nations. Controlling the flow of nuclear expertise is a global
problem and it calls for a global response. There may be too many
incentives for individuals to divulge information about, or help in the
creation of, nuclear weapons. Additionally, even if the proliferator's native
country prohibits nuclear expertise proliferation, as was the case with
Pakistan , there may be too many reasons for the individual country not to
prosecute. Creating an international convention which would proscribe
these activities is a logical step in the direction of effective prevention.
2. Insider Theft17
Nuclear facilities face threats from a variety of “potential
adversaries with ideological, economic, and personal motives.”18
Unfortunately, the greatest threat comes from their employees. While a
number of factors contribute to an employee's decision to steal, age is the
most likely indicator.19 In a study of insider/outsider crime performed for
the Department of Energy, approximately one half of the employees who
conspired with an outsider were less than thirty years old.20 Nevertheless,
even long term employees may resort to stealing nuclear information for
16

Id.
There are three general categories of insider theft: (1) crimes committed by insiders
conspiring with outsiders, (2) crimes committed by insiders conspiring with other
insiders, and (3) crimes committed by lone insiders. Nevertheless, the first category is the
most likely scenario because terrorists working with an insider are probably more likely
to attempt a crime against a nuclear facility than either set of individuals in (1) or (2).
HOFFMAN, supra note 11, at 7-30.
18
See id. at 1.
19
Id. at 7-9.
20
Id.
17
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profit, believing they have been overlooked for promotions or believing
the facility has not guaranteed that the employee will retire in comfort.21
The problem of insider theft at nuclear facilities is almost as
serious as the threat of scientists selling their knowledge in the nuclear
black market. It certainly includes a larger section of the scientific
community because even low level employees may have access to, or the
ability to obtain, sensitive information.22

It also produces the same

general result in that terrorists receive classified nuclear secrets. Because
this is a constant, the international community should address the issue in
a new convention in nuclear terrorism.
B. Nuclear Smuggling
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented
181 cases of nuclear trafficking since 1993.23 The majority of these cases
involved materials that could be used in an improvised nuclear device,
which is a makeshift device intended to result in the formation of a lowyield nuclear reaction. However, twenty cases involved “weapons-grade”
nuclear material, the most perilous form of nuclear material because of its
potential use in full-scale, high-yield nuclear weapons.24 For example, in
December of 1994, police officials in Prague arrested three nuclear
workers from Eastern Europe who were transporting three kilograms of
highly enriched uranium. Officials believed that the material came from
either a Russian Navy storage facility or a fuel fabrication site in the

21

Id. at 9.
Id. at 7-9.
23
Elizabeth Sullivan, Nuclear Security is Frighteningly Lax All Over, THE
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 30, 2002, at H5.
24
Id.
22
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former Soviet Union.25 Russia and the former Soviet Union are the most
likely suspects in these type of situations because only one third of their
facilities are considered secure.26
What are other countries doing to prevent smuggled material from
entering their borders? In the United States, the Customs Service recently
issued pocket-sized radiation detectors to customs inspectors at more than
300 entry points across the nation.27 However, with lengthy borders and
such an expansive coastline, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to catch
all such material before it enters the country. Nevertheless, the U.S. is
fortunate because most countries do not have the means to enact such
preventative measures. Consequently, international cooperation is
essential in the fight against nuclear smuggling. The international
community must work together to effectively close down the nuclear black
market and eliminate the nuclear threat by creating a new international
agreement that focuses on two specific forms of nuclear smuggling: (1)
the transportation of uranium or plutonium that can be used in building an
improvised nuclear device, and (2) the transportation of a completed
nuclear weapon.
1. Improvised Nuclear Devices
Building an improvised nuclear device (IND) is not a complicated
process. “If you had a softball-sized lump of enriched uranium, some
materials mostly available at Radio Shack and an engineering grad from
an American university, you would have a reasonable chance of making a
25

Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window: A Legal
Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV . 667, 672 (1996). This
shows that insider crime and nuclear smuggling are often interrelated.
26
Vicki Haddock, Loose Nukes: A Radioactive “Dirty Bomb” Could be Headed for Your
Neighborhood, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, April 28, 2002, at D1.
27
Jeannine Aversa, Customs to Issue Radiation Detectors; Agency Offers No Guarantees,
SUN-SENTINEL, May 30, 2002, at A11.

Vol. 2 [2003]

NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET
Thomas Burch

92

crude nuclear weapon.”28 The only difficult part of the equation is finding
the nuclear material. However, even this is not a complicated problem
because there are two main sources where the material is readily available:
(1) the former Soviet Union , and (2) nuclear reprocessing facilities.29
Senator Joe Biden explains where one side of the risk originates:
Over the past two years, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has held a series of
hearings outlining the threat posed by
weapons of mass destruction to U.S.
national security. In the course of these
hearings, one simple fact has stood out.
There are many sources for weapons of
mass destruction, and it can take years to
obtain or build them. But there's one place
that has it all. That place is Russia.30
In fact, Russia still possesses approximately 1,000 metric tons of
highly enriched uranium, and 160 metric tons of weapons grade
plutonium.31 “Some of this material is secured with the equivalent of
bicycle locks.”32

28

INDs do not require a critical mass of uranium or

The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Safeguarding Against Acts of
Terrorism: Hearings Before the International Operations and Human Rights Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of the Hon.
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairperson, Subcomm. on International Operations and Human
Rights) (quoting Graham Allison, Director, Harvard Belfer Center ) [hereinafter
International Atomic Energy Agency]. Experts often dispute terrorists' abilities to
produce even an improvised nuclear device. However, most seem to agree that, with the
right materials and time, it is entirely possible. See GAVIN CAMERON, NUCLEAR
TERRORISM: A THREAT ASSESMENT FOR THE 21st CENTURY 131 (1999).
29
See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 671-75.
30
Loose Nukes, Biological Terrorism, and Chemical Warfare: Using Russian Debt to
Enhance Security: Hearings Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 107th
Cong. 65 (2002) (statement of Senator Joe Biden, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations) [hereinafter Loose Nukes]. This paper is not an attempt to criticize Russia and
the former Soviet Union. However, these regions present a major risk and they provide a
good example of why certain measures need to be taken to reduce the risk of a nuclear
terrorist conflict.
31
Id.
32
Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, at 56.

Vol. 2 [2003]

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
www.scu.edu/scjil

93

plutonium, and the material may not have to be “weapons-grade.”33 In
fact, plutonium oxide, which is often stored at reprocessing plants, can be
converted to plutonium metal in a straightforward chemical process.34
This is a frightening prospect considering the lack of security at
reprocessing plants worldwide. Nuclear energy supporters often attempt to
allay security fears by using phrases like “nuclear plants are probably the
most hardened commercial structures in the world.”35

This is not a

legitimate answer. There are seventy-plus storage centers in the U.S. alone
and, internationally, ninety-three new reactors will be operating by 2016.36
Certainly the best answer for security concerns cannot be that these
facilities are “hardened.” Storage centers and reprocessing plants suffer
from a severe lack of financial support and the international community
should carefully address this need in a new convention on nuclear
terrorism.
2. Loose Nukes
While finding and purchasing a completed nuclear weapon might
be incredibly complicated, it is not impossible. At a recent hearing before
the House Committee on National Security, a former Director of Russian
and Ukrainian Affairs for the National Security Council stated that
“[s]enior Russian officials have expressed grave concerns about
inadequate security for warheads in transit as well as in storage.”37 Also,
the Russian military “faces ‘chronic shortages' of specially equipped trains

33

See CAMERON, supra note 28, at 131-32.
Id. at 132.
35
Senator Pete Domenici, The Need for Nuclear Energy – Four Years after the Harvard
Speech, Address at Texas A & M University (November 19, 2001) available at
http://nuclearanswer.tamu.edu/Domenici.pdf.
36
Id.
37
See Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, at 56.
34

Vol. 2 [2003]

NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET
Thomas Burch

94

to protect against acts of sabotage.”38 The possibility that terrorists can
acquire a completed nuclear weapon is not unthinkable. Many countries
are unable to provide adequate security for these weapons because of their
depressed economic conditions.39
Inadequate security at nuclear facilities is a serious threat that
requires significant attention. During the last decade, Congress authorized
more than three billion dollars for a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program aimed at securing Russian facilities.40

However, this is a

unilateral approach and involving the international community is
necessary for reducing the potential threat. Creating an international
convention that focuses on, among other things, securing nuclear facilities
will go a long way in preventing terrorists from achieving their new
objectives.
C. The Evolving Terrorist Objective
Until recently, most terrorist activities involved relatively lowlevel violence. However, many terrorist groups are progressively
loosening their moral or political inhibitions.41 Radicals are no longer
constrained by fear of reprisal because they are obsessed with extremist
ideas of immortality. The pursuit of immortality produces a frightening
prospect in that terrorist are now willing to take extreme measures to
achieve catastrophic results.
In March of 2002, several news sources reported an alleged plan to
bring a nuclear device to New York City.42 This turned out to be a hoax,
but it raises awareness about a new set of terrorist objectives. Nuclear
terrorists may “be intent on inducing casualties, perhaps immediately as
38

Id.
See id.
40
PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 5, at 73.
41
See id. at 56-57.
42
See, e.g., Megan Turner, Terror ‘Plot' to Nuke N.Y. Revealed, N.Y. POST, March 4,
2002, at A3.
39
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the result of radiation sickness, or longer term, as the result of cancers that
might be induced by radiation exposure.”43 Introducing nuclear weapons
to a densely populated environment exemplifies the new terrorist goal.
Prior to World War II, no one worried about such a possibility, but today,
this is a constant threat.
Terrorists have the ability to achieve at least some of their
objectives and several courses of action are necessary to prevent this from
happening. Section III discusses existing conventions on nuclear terrorism
but it concludes that such conventions are inadequate preventative
measures. They are not comprehensive and most focus on punishment
rather than prevention. Nevertheless, understanding the weaknesses of
these instruments will help to develop the proposed convention in Section
IV.
III. EXPLORING EXISTING TREATIES, CONVENTIONS
& OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAWS
States have numerous reasons to avoid participating in the nuclear
black market: economic sanctions, military reprisal, etc. However, most
deterrents do not apply to non-state actors. What actions should the
international community take in order to enforce these same restrictions
against individuals or terrorist groups, and thereby reduce the possibility
of nuclear conflict?
As a preliminary matter, the international community should
recognize nuclear smuggling and nuclear-expertise proliferation by nonstate actors as international crimes. One way of accomplishing this
recognition would be to amend or expand any or all of the following
international instruments: (1) the Non-Proliferation Treaty;44 (2) the
43

See Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Dr. Steven E.
Koonin, Provost, California Institute of Technology).
44
See Treiger, supra note 11, at 241-46.
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Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials;45 (3) the
Rome Statute;46 or (4) the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombing. However, amending these treaties and conventions
may prove unworkable. Expanding jurisdiction under customary
international law is another option, but many, if not most, nations require
lawmaking bodies to incorporate customary international law into
domestic law before the nation's courts will recognize such law in judicial
proceedings.47 Thus, drafting a new convention that focuses on preventing
non-state actors from participating in the nuclear black market is essential.
Amending the existing treaties or expanding jurisdiction under customary
international law are not satisfactory methods for reducing the terrorist
nuclear threat.
A. Amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty to Cover
Non-State Actors
1. Scope of the Agreement
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is
the most comprehensive attempt to control the spread of nuclear materials
and nuclear expertise.48 It is more than thirty years old and every nation is
a party to the treaty except for Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North
Korea.49

45

See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 714-15.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 121, 37 I.L.M.
999. [hereinafter Rome Statute].
47
See Treiger, supra note 11, at 250-58; INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, HARD CASES: BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE
ABROAD , A GUIDE TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39 (1999), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/10.pdf (last visited Jan 26, 2004 ).
48
See Jeffrey B. Fugal, Comment, A Brief Survey of the Smuggling of Fissile Material:
An Embryonic Phenomena with a Terrifying Future in the European Community, 6 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 301 (1995).
49
PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 5, at 73.
46
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Under the NPT, the five nuclear weapons states50 agree not to
export nuclear weapons to other nuclear states and not to assist any nonnuclear weapon state in the manufacture of nuclear devices.51 The nonnuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and to work with the
IAEA to ensure that they only use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.52
The acceptance of, and adherence to, these duties is essential for the
government to perform effectively.
Article I of the NPT states:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the
Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or control
over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear-weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.53
Article II covers the duties of non-nuclear nations:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the
Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and not to seek or receive any assistance in
50

Nuclear weapons states only include those countries which had manufactured and
exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967. That includes the U.S., the United
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. I, 21 U.S.T.
483, 487, 79 U.N.T.S. 161, 171 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty], available at
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html (last visited Jan 26, 2004 ).
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the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.54
Expanding Articles I & II to include non-state actors will
automatically make nuclear expertise proliferation and nuclear smuggling
an international crime.55 This would not only send a message that the
international community will not tolerate a nuclear black market; “it
would also lead to the establishment of affirmative programs of
enforcement” in each member state.56 Finally, it would establish virtual
universal jurisdiction over the crimes since all but five nations are
members of the NPT, making the actions punishable in almost every
country in the world.
2. The Amendment Process & Questioning the Stability of the NPT
The amendment process for the NPT is fairly straightforward. Onethird of the member-nations must request a conference to consider the
amendment, and a majority of the countries at the meeting must approve
the modification.57 At the 2000 conference of NPT members, the parties
agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely and to eventually accomplish total
nuclear disarmament.58 However, the circumstances surrounding the NPT
have changed tremendously since 2000, and amending the Treaty may be
a difficult task because it is unstable as it stands.59
In January 2003, North Korea dropped out after more than
seventeen years as a member of the agreement.60 This decision allows

54

Id. at art. II.
See Treiger, supra note 11, at 241-45; Fugal, supra note 44, at 301-05.
56
See id. at 248.
57
Non-Proliferation Treaty, at art. VIII.
58
PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE, supra note 5, at 73.
59
See Treiger, supra note 11, at 244.
60
Sonni Efron & Lianne Hart, The World Diplomatic Standoff: North Korean Action
Draws Global Condemnation, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A1.
55
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North Korea to completely avoid the regulations of the IAEA, and,
according to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, North Korea
poses a severe threat in terms of nuclear proliferation to non-state actors.61
This fact alone should make the parties to the NPT focus on the
relative weakness of the NPT's enforcement controls. Rather than
attempting to change the face of the NPT by including non-state actors,
member countries should strongly consider amending the Article X to
strengthen the Treaty's enforcement mechanisms.62

Strengthening the

existing Agreement will still assist in preventing nuclear smuggling and
information proliferation. In addition to this, however, the international
community should draft a new agreement that specifically focuses on nonstate actors and the problems discussed in Section II of this paper. The
new agreement will extend the protections in the NPT and the
international community should draft the new agreement with the
principles of the NPT in mind.
B. Amending & Expanding the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials
1. Background on the CPPNM
Sixty-eight nations have adopted the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials, making it the second most widely
adopted treaty on nuclear proliferation.63

Under the agreement, all

signatory parties agree to criminalize “the receipt, possession, use,

61

James Dao, U.S. Official Says North Korea Could Sell Bomb Material, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2003, at A1.
62
Non-Proliferation Treaty, at art. X. At the very least, an amendment to Article X
should: (1) include stiff sanctions for countries that violate the NPT and then decide to
drop out, and (2) extend the current three month notice period to provide more time for
negotiations and more time for countries to reconsider their decision. See NonProliferation Treaty, at art. X.
63
See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 714-15.
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transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material” and the “theft
or robbery of nuclear material” by non-state actors.64

However, the

Convention only covers nuclear materials that are used for peaceful
purposes.65 It does not apply to nuclear materials in military stockpiles,
which actually poses one of the most serious threats.66

Thus a

considerable gap exists in the Convention's coverage.67 While the current
restrictions in the Convention are important, extending the Convention's
coverage to nuclear material that is not used for peaceful purposes is
absolutely necessary because this is the most prolific source of material on
the nuclear black market.68
Under Article XX of the CPPNM, any state party may propose an
amendment to the Convention.69 The proposed amendment is circulated
to all parties, and if two-thirds of the parties call for a conference to vote
on the proposal, a conference will take place no sooner than thirty days
after invitations to the conference are issued.70

If the amendment is

approved by two-thirds of all state parties, then it will enter into force for
each party that ratifies the provision thirty days after the ratification.71
2. An Effective yet Limited Agreement
The United States or any other state party to the Convention could
propose an amendment to make the convention apply to nuclear material
not used for peaceful purposes. The earlier the amendment is proposed,
64

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, art.
VII(1)(a)-(b), 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2000), [hereinafter Physical Protection Convention]
available at http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_convention_nuclear_material.html.
65
Id. at art. II(1).
66
Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 714-15.
67
Id. at 715.
68
See Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, at 56-57; Loose Nukes, at 65.
69
Physical Protection Convention, at art. 20(1).
70
Id.
71
Id. at art. 20(2).

Vol. 2 [2003]

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
www.scu.edu/scjil

101

the easier the amendment process should be because fewer countries will
need to agree with the proposal and all future signatories will be bound by
the terms of the agreement when they sign.
However,

one

can

never

predict

the

potential

political

complications of such a process and it may take time to obtain the
amendment. Furthermore, even if the parties to the agreement approved
such an amendment, the CPPNM would still be too limited in scope
because it would not cover nuclear information proliferation. The CPPNM
only applies to the illegal transfer of “material,” and, according to the
definition provided in the text of the Convention, “material” only includes
plutonium and uranium.72 Changing the definition to include some form
of nuclear knowledge may be somewhat outside of the scope of the
Convention and may be difficult to pass in an amendment process.
Nevertheless, members of the Convention should encourage other
countries to participate in the current agreement. More nations need to
criminalize nuclear smuggling to reduce the number of safe havens for
non-state actors that participate in the nuclear black market. The CPPNM
is an effective tool for combating nuclear smuggling, but it is just too
limited in scope. Drafting an entirely new agreement is still the best
option, and it is necessary to fill the gap left by other conventions.
C. A Liberal Interpretation of the Rome Statute
Negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal
Court began with a United Nations resolution in 1995 and ended with the
adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.73 The statute has 128 Articles,74 is
72

Id. at art. 1(a).
John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court and International Lawmaking in the 21 st Century, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 361,
363 (1999).
74
Id.
73
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signed by 120 nations,75 and is intended to have “jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern….”76
Amending the Rome Statute would be the most difficult means of
classifying nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation as
international crimes. The Treaty cannot be amended until seven years after
it entered into force (2008), and any amendment requires approval by
seven-eighths of the State Parties.77 Additionally, the Rome Statute is the
subject of some amount of controversy. Some believe that it undermines
the authority of the UN Security Council and that it improperly asserts
jurisdiction over citizens of countries that are not parties to the
Agreement.78 Because of these perceptions, many nations have not signed
the Treaty.79 Finally, there may be a problem with including nuclear
smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation in the Rome Statute because
the Treaty only covers genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
the crime of aggression.80

Classifying nuclear smuggling or nuclear

information proliferation within any of these categories is a bit of a
stretch.
1. Crimes Against Humanity
The definition of crimes against humanity is extremely vague. The
Rome Statute describes this category of crimes as activities that (1) “are
75

Id. at 361.
Rome Statute, at art. 1.
77
Id. at art. 121(1).
78
M. Tia Johnson, The American Service Members' Protection Act: Protecting Whom?,
43 VA. J. INT'L L . 405, 475-76 (2003). Ms. Johnson is a Colonel in the Judge Advocate
General's Corps, U.S. Army. Since June 2002, she has been deployed to Bosnia as the
Senior Legal Advisor to the NATO Peacekeeping Force.
79
See id.
80
Rome Statute, at art. 5(1); see also L EILA NADYA SADAT, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM 132-64 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2002).
76
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among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole,” (2) “warrant and entail individual criminal responsibility,”
and (3) “require conduct which is impermissible under generally
applicable international law, as recognized by the principle legal systems
of the world.”81 The crimes of nuclear expertise proliferation and nuclear
smuggling could satisfy these elements, thereby granting jurisdiction over
these activities to the International Criminal Court. However, the
international community leans toward a rigid interpretation that includes
only the most horrendous activities, such as genocide. Nuclear smuggling
and proliferation do not fit within this category.
2. Crimes of Aggression
Nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation could also
qualify as crimes of aggression if members of the Treaty adopt a liberal
definition of this category of crimes. Crimes of aggression theoretically
include state actions that severely intrude upon the sovereignty of another
state, but no official classification of the crime actually exists.82 The
Rome Statute explicitly states that the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression until members of the Treaty adopt a provision
defining the crime in accordance with Articles 121 & 123 of the
Agreement.83 However, states are unlikely to classify the crime in its
conventional sense anytime soon, because then any attack or use of force
by one state against another might be punishable under this category.84
Adopting a definition of crimes of aggression that focuses on nonstate actors rather than nation-states should be more acceptable to the
members of the Treaty because it eliminates the potential threat to national
81

Rome Statute, at art. 7(1).
SADAT, supra note 80, at 132-34.
83
Id.
84
See id. at 133, n. 20. Note 20 defines the “conventional” crimes of aggression.
82
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sovereignty. Members should not disagree over whether to prosecute
persons for these activities since it would not involve State liability.
Therefore, including these provisions should alleviate any concerns over
State liability and should improve the chances of adding such an
amendment to the Treaty.85 However, nuclear smuggling and nuclear
information proliferation are truly not crimes of aggression. This category
of crimes just happens to have a name that theoretically could include a
broad number of offenses. Actually, the category of crimes of aggression
is somewhat limited in scope and the proper method of addressing nuclear
smuggling and nuclear information proliferation is through a new draft
convention.
3. A Final Consideration
There is one more concern for amending the Statute to include
nuclear crimes. The original negotiators of the Rome Statute intentionally
excluded the use of nuclear weapons from the list of weapons that are
illegal per se. However, this was because of political differences between
nuclear and non-nuclear states and it has nothing to do with the terrorist
acts of non-state actors.86 The parties to the Treaty should be willing to
codify nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation as
international crimes because these activities, unlike the use of nuclear
85

The amendment to the Rome Statute would have to include a bright line rule that
anyone apprehended for nuclear smuggling or nuclear expertise proliferation is presumed
to be acting in an individual capacity, not on behalf of the State. However, many nations
may have a problem with including a provision that would theoretically allow another
country's court system to prosecute the outside nations' State Officials as non-state actors.
In fact, the ICJ recently ruled that State officials have immunity from prosecution in the
national courts of another country while they are in office. See Case Concerning the
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium ) ( Feb
14, 2002 ) [(hereinafter Congo v. Belgium ]. But see In re Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M . 68
(1998) (holding that national officials are not protected by sovereign immunity for acts
that are prohibited by treaty or customary international law).
86
SADAT, supra note 80, at 267.
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weapons by a State Party, are per se objectionable. Nevertheless, the
proper means of explicitly classifying these activities as international
crimes is to draft a new convention, not force nuclear smuggling and
proliferation into an ill-fitted document simply because it already exists.
D. Shortcomings of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombing
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombing (TBC) criminalizes the delivery, discharge, placement, or
detonation of an explosive device in “ a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure
facility.”87 The United States started negotiations for the TBC in 1996
after terrorists placed a bomb in the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, killing seventeen members of the United States Air Force.88
However, even though the U.S. started the TBC negotiations, and was the
first country to sign the Convention, Congress has not ratified the
agreement. Nevertheless, twenty-seven countries are currently members of
the TBC.89
The creation of the TBC further proves that the international
community is taking important steps to prevent terrorist activities.
However, this Convention is too limited in scope. It fails to cover nuclear
87

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, Jan. 12, 1998 ,
entered into force May, 2001, art. II(1) 37 I.L.M. 239 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing
Convention], available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_convention_terrorist_bombing.html (entered into
force May, 2001) (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
88
Sean D. Murphy, Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and on
Financing, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 255, 256 (2002).
89
CAMPAIGN FOR U.N. REFORM: BRINGING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
TO JUSTICE, BACKGROUND ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS, available at
http://www.cunr.org/priorities/International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppressi
on%20of%20Terrorist%20Bombings.htm. (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
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expertise proliferation and, since the TBC only applies to completed
explosive devices, it neglects the smuggling of nuclear material that has
not yet been made into an explosive device. Even if the parties to the TBC
liberally interpret the provisions of the Convention to cover the smuggling
of nuclear material as an “accomplice” activity,90 countries could still only
punish the smugglers after the material is used to build an explosive
device that is delivered, placed, detonated, or discharged. At this point, the
terrorist already achieved his goal. Either the bomb has detonated and
caused mass destruction, or, at the very least, someone has delivered or
placed the device in a public facility, spreading intense public fear when
the public learns of the event. Countries should focus on preemptively
curtailing these activities, not on punishment after the fact.
Additionally, the TBC requires a specific intent “to cause death or
serious bodily injury” or a specific intent “to cause extensive destruction
of such a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is
likely to result in major economic loss.”91 The specific intent standard is
too high. Simple possession of plutonium or uranium should suffice for
prosecution since courts can presume intent to harm from the possession
of such dangerous materials. Considering the scope of the TBC's
insufficiency with regards to nuclear smuggling and nuclear information
proliferation, an amendment to cover these activities would almost require
a redrafting of the entire Convention.
E. Expanding Jurisdiction under Customary International Law
1. The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction may attach to the crimes of nuclear
smuggling and nuclear information proliferation under customary
90
91

See Terrorist Bombing Convention, at art. II(1).
Id.
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international law.92 However, expanding universal jurisdiction to cover
these crimes will require an active judiciary. To date, no court has been
faced with the issue of whether these activities are atrocious enough to fall
within the scope of universal jurisdiction, and courts may be unwilling to
expand the application of the doctrine without valid justification, i.e. prior
case history to support their decision.93

However, the exercise of

jurisdiction over these crimes is acceptable so long as it is reasonable, and
reasonable is a loose term.94 A brief survey of analogous case law and
relevant literature will show that such an expansion may be justified.
Universal jurisdiction allows states to punish “certain conduct
outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”95
The doctrine is based on the theory that some crimes are so universally
condemned that the perpetrators are enemies of all people and can be
punished in any and all jurisdictions.96
Originally, only piracy and slave trading qualified for universal
punishment.97

However, the category of qualifying offenses has

significantly expanded over the last fifty years to include “certain terrorist
acts, hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, apartheid, torture, and other
human rights violations.”98
92

See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 785, 791-801 (1988); Treiger, supra note 11, at 253-58; Kellman & Gualtieri,
supra note 25, at 719.
93
See, e.g., United States v. Suerte, No. 00-0659, 2001 WL 1877264 *5 (S.D. Tex. Jun
06, 2001), rev'd on other grounds, by United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir.
2002).
94
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2) (1987). For
example, exercising jurisdiction is reasonable if “the person … had carried on outside the
state an activity having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the state.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(j) (1987).
95
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) (1987).
96
United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 1994).
97
See Randall, supra note 9293, at 791-801.
98
Id. at 788-89.
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Perhaps one of the more interesting U.S. cases involving universal
jurisdiction is United States v. Yunis.99 Yunis was one of four hijackers
that took control of Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402 shortly before its
departure from Beirut, Lebanon. After a series of forced crossMediterranean flights, which included several layovers for fuel and
supplies, the four men directed the pilot to return to Beirut . Once in
Beirut, the hijackers released the passengers, held a press conference, blew
up the plane, and fled from the airport. An American investigation
determined that Yunis was the leader of the group, which prompted the
FBI to plan for Yunis' arrest - even though Yunis was still in Lebanon.100
Undercover FBI agents lured Yunis onto a
yacht in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with
promises of a drug deal, and arrested him
once the vessel entered international waters.
The agents transferred Yunis to a United
States Navy munitions ship and interrogated
him for several days as the vessel steamed
toward a second rendezvous, this time with a
Navy aircraft carrier. Yunis was flown to
Andrews Air Force Base from the aircraft
carrier, and taken from there to Washington
, D.C. In Washington , Yunis was arraigned
on an original indictment charging him with
conspiracy, hostage taking, and aircraft
damage. A grand jury subsequently returned
a superseding indictment adding additional
aircraft damage counts and a charge of air
piracy.101

99

924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [Yunis II].
Id. at 1089.
101
Id. Yunis argued that the court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction in light of
the government's conduct; however, the court disagreed, stating that “while the
government's conduct was neither ‘picture perfect' nor ‘a model for law enforcement
behavior,'…we now find nothing in the record suggesting the sort of intentional,
outrageous government conduct necessary to sustain appellant's jurisdictional argument.”
Id. at 1093.
100
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The Federal Court for the District of D.C. held that hijacking an
aircraft is a crime that is universally condemned, basing its decision on
several international treaties that specifically covered the subject.102 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the hijacking of an aircraft may
be subject to universal jurisdiction, but the Court decided to rule against
Yunis on other grounds,103 leaving open the question of whether activities
which are proscribed by Treaty are subject to the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction.
The general rule is that “jurisdiction does not lie under the
Universal Principle merely because the crime is subject to an international
agreement. Rather, customary law must accept the crime as subject to
universal jurisdiction.”104 However, implicit in that statement is the idea
that international law will accept a crime as subject to universal
jurisdiction if the crime is prohibited by a Treaty that is signed by a
substantial number of parties.105

In fact, crimes that are subject to

universal jurisdiction are often a matter of international convention or
treaty.106
This is an important issue in terms of nuclear smuggling. The
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials prohibits “the
receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of
nuclear material” and the “theft or robbery of nuclear material” by non102

United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-903 (D.D.C. 1988) rev'd on other
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [Yunis I].
103
Yunis II, 924 F.2d at 1092.
104
United States v. Suerte, No. 00-0659, 2001 WL 1877264, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jun 06,
2001), rev'd on other grounds, by United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002).
105
See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) rev'd on other
grounds, by Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that crimes
condemned by the world community and subject to prosecution under universal
jurisdiction are often a matter of international conventions or treaties. The only
requirement is that these treaties be signed by a significant number of states.); see also
Yunis I, 681 F.Supp. 899-903 (holding that airplane hijacking is universally condemned
based on several international treaties that specifically forbid hijacking).
106
Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
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state actors.107 Also, sixty-eight countries are party to the agreement,
which is a substantial number of nations. This may be enough for the
international community to consider nuclear smuggling a crime that is so
widely condemned that it is subject to the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction. However, it is problematic that the Convention applies solely
to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, courts might
be willing to expand this to include military nuclear material when
deciding whether universal jurisdiction should apply. Nuclear smuggling,
whether it involves peaceful or military material, should certainly fit
within the category of “certain terrorist acts” that are covered under
universal jurisdiction.
2. Solution of Last Resort
Yet, the international community should still explicitly criminalize
nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation by passing domestic
laws that recognize these activities as international crimes because in
many states customary international law must be incorporated into
domestic law before the nation's courts will recognize such law in judicial
proceedings.108 Courts are less likely to assert jurisdiction if the assertion
requires a distinct measure of judicial creativity. Learned Hand once stated
that “[w]e should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its
courts can catch….”109 Therefore, relying solely on the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction should be the last resort for punishing the crimes of
nuclear smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation. The most viable
options are for states to explicitly define these activities as international

107

Physical Protection Convention, at art. VII(1)(a)-(b), 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2000),
available at http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_convention_nuclear_material.html.).
108
See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 39.
109
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d. 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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crimes through the treaty process and to enact domestic laws in
furtherance of those treaties.
IV. DEVELOPING A MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR
SMUGGLING AND PROLIFERATION
A. The UN Call to Arms
The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee is in the process of
developing a “comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing
with international terrorism.”110 It is highly probable that one of these
conventions will cover nuclear terrorism since U.N. Resolution 1373
“notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism
and…the illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other
potentially deadly materials….”111 The U.N. will play a pivotal role in
developing this convention on nuclear terrorism and it should continue to
advocate for a comprehensive approach to preventing terrorist activities
that addresses regional conflicts and the full range of global issues that are
necessary to achieve international cooperation.112
B. Learning from Existing Treaties
The U.N. Ad Hoc Committee must resolve a number of issues
before actually drafting the new convention.113 Most importantly, it must

110

G.A. Res. 56/88 U.N. GAOR, Fifty-Sixth Session, 8th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/88 (2002).
111
G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. GAOR, 4385th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 Meeting
(2001), available at http://www.undcp.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf
(emphasis added) (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
112
See G.A. Res. 1377 U.N. GAOR, 4413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377Meeting (2001),
available at http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/633/01/PDF/N0163301.pdf?OpenElement (last visited
Jan, 26, 2004).
113
See G.A. Res. 56/88 U.N. GAOR, supra note 111.Fifty-Sixth Session (2002).
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decide how to address the inadequacies of the existing treaties.114 The
NPT is a good case study because its language is broad enough to cover
both nuclear smuggling and nuclear information proliferation. However,
the NPT only applies to states. Any future convention on international
terrorism must focus on preventing non-state actors from participating in
the nuclear black market. The current lack of coverage for individuals is
surprising and the international community should address the problem as
soon as practicable.
Furthermore, the new convention on nuclear terrorism should
focus on prevention rather than punishment. It should attempt to
preemptively curtail nuclear smuggling and information proliferation and
not concentrate on punishment after the fact. Finally, the U.N. should
expand the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to act
as a monitoring body that observes and implements the convention's
regulations. This is a practical decision because the International Atomic
Energy Agency already performs such duties under its relationship with
the NPT.
C. The Role of the IAEA
The International Atomic Energy Agency works in tandem with
the Non-Proliferation Treaty by establishing and enforcing safeguards to
ensure that non-nuclear States do not use nuclear materials, equipment,
and facilities to further a military purpose.115 The Agency is a perfect
complement to the NPT,116 and it should also work extremely well under
the new convention on nuclear terrorism. In 1994, “the Agency developed
a program to address illicit trafficking of nuclear material,” which
“focuses on helping countries strengthen their nuclear laws and
114

Id.
See LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, THE NONPROLIFERATION ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AGENCY: A CRITICAL ASSESMENT 21-30 (1985).
116
See id. at 29.
115
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infrastructures to ensure greater … security over these materials.” The
new program also helps countries “detect and respond to illegal
movements of radioactive materials....”117 Therefore, the IAEA is the
ideal agency for combating nuclear terrorism under the new convention.
Nevertheless, the IAEA faces several problems,118 including the fact that
the Agency can only act through, and with the cooperation of, the
governments of the countries it regulates.119 In order for the IAEA to be
effective, governments must be willing to support and implement the
Agency's proposed safeguards.
The U.N. should adopt policies to strengthen the role of the IAEA,
possibly even giving the IAEA control over the entire nuclear cycle.120
However, most countries, especially the nuclear states, are probably not
willing to relinquish total control. The best answer is to give the IAEA
more funding and broader, though not unlimited, discretionary power.
This will allow the agency to more aggressively and consistently enforce
the rule of law.
D. Enlisting the Services of Interpol
Interpol is an international police organization that facilitates
cross-border criminal investigations among the organization's 181 member
countries.121

Enlisting the services of Interpol and strengthening its

international police capabilities pursuant to a treaty on nuclear terrorism
are vital steps for overcoming inadequacies that are inherent in domestic

117

See International Atomic Energy Agency, at 3.
See generally, SCHEINMAN, supra note 117, at 32-59 (Scheinman focuses on
politicization and credibility as the major problems facing the IAEA).
119
See Fugal, supra note 48, at 307.
120
See id. at 308.
121
Interpol, An Overview, at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/FactSheets/FS200101.asp.
118
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114

The international character of nuclear

smuggling and proliferation “implies that police efforts should transcend
national boundaries.”123

Therefore, the U.N. and the IAEA should

establish a working relationship with Interpol to more effectively combat
these terrorist activities. Interpol has extensive experience with
international terrorism, and it could help considerably in the efforts to
prevent nuclear smuggling and proliferation by non-state actors.
E. Passing Domestic Laws on Money Laundering
The frequency of international terrorist acts is proportionate to the
financing that terrorists receive. Therefore, the elimination of funding
should result in the elimination of the activity. “It is critical that law
enforcement target the financial sponsors of terrorist activities, not just the
actual perpetrators of the terrorist acts.”124 U.N. Resolution 1373 calls for
all nations to take “additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their
territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any
acts of terrorism.”125

Since terrorist funds are laundered through

legitimate businesses, the U.N. should encourage countries to pass
domestic laws that require greater scrutiny of suspect financial
transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The nuclear black market poses a serious threat to the international
community. Since existing treaties are inadequate with regards to nuclear
smuggling and nuclear expertise proliferation by non-state actors, the
122

See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 25, at 720.
Id. at 719-20.
124
See Interpol, The Financing of Terrorism, available at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Terrorism/financing.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).
125
See G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, supra note 112, at 1.
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international community should specifically define these activities as
international crimes under a new convention on nuclear terrorism. The
new convention should focus on prevention rather than punishment, and it
should encourage nations to enact domestic laws that support the character
of the agreement. International cooperation is necessary for the convention
to succeed and the U.N will play a pivotal role in ensuring this
collaboration. Finally, enlisting the help of agencies like the IAEA and
Interpol should greatly reduce the future occurrences of nuclear smuggling
and nuclear information proliferation because both agencies have
extensive experience with international terrorism. While these suggestions
may not completely eliminate the possibility of non-state actors initiating
future nuclear conflict, they should significantly reduce the threat.

